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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/609,317	06/27/2003	Joseph Daniel Coenen	K-C 13485.1	7356
7590 09/16/2004			EXAMINER	
Pauley Petersen Kinne & Erickson Suite 365			PURVIS, SUE A	
2800 W. Higgins Road			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
Hoffman Estates, IL 60195			1734	
			DATE MAIL ED. 00/14/200	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)
Advisory Action	10/609,317	COENEN ET AL.
, in the second	Examiner	Art Unit
	Sue A. Purvis	1734
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	orrespondence address
THE REPLY FILED 30 August 2004 FAILS TO PLACE T Therefore, further action by the applicant is required to av final rejection under 37 CFR 1.113 may <u>only</u> be either: (1) condition for allowance; (2) a timely filed Notice of Appeal Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114.	oid abandonment of this applicated abandonment of this applicated and abandonent which	ation. A proper reply to a
PERIOD FOR RE	PLY [check either a) or b)]	
a) The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailing		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire Is ONLY CHECK THIS BOX WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS 706.07(f).	ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF TH	g date of the final rejection. IE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of t (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Officitimely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 C	f extension and the corresponding amo the shortened statutory period for reply the later than three months after the mail	unt of the fee. The appropriate extension
1. A Notice of Appeal was filed on Appellant's 37 CFR 1.192(a), or any extension thereof (37 CFR	Brief must be filed within the pe	riod set forth in f the appeal.
2. The proposed amendment(s) will not be entered be		
(a) X they raise new issues that would require furthe	er consideration and/or search (s	see NOTE below);
(b) they raise the issue of new matter (see Note b	.	,
(c) they are not deemed to place the application ir issues for appeal; and/or	better form for appeal by mater	rially reducing or simplifying the
(d) they present additional claims without cancelingNOTE:	ng a corresponding number of fi	nally rejected claims.
3. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejecti	ion(s):	
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would canceling the non-allowable claim(s). 	be allowable if submitted in a se	parate, timely filed amendment
5. ☐ The a) ☐ affidavit, b) ☐ exhibit, or c) ☐ request for application in condition for allowance because:	reconsideration has been consider	dered but does NOT place the
6. The affidavit or exhibit will NOT be considered becaraised by the Examiner in the final rejection.	ause it is not directed SOLELY to	o issues which were newly
7. For purposes of Appeal, the proposed amendment(explanation of how the new or amended claims wo	(s) a)⊠ will not be entered or b) uld be rejected is provided belo	☐ will be entered and an wor appended.
The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		
Claim(s) allowed: <u>1-6 and 22</u> .		
Claim(s) objected to:		
Claim(s) rejected: <u>7-21 and 23</u> .		
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:		
8. The drawing correction filed on is a) appro	oved or b) disapproved by the	ne Examiner.
9. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statemen		
0.⊠ Other: <u>See Continuation Sheet</u>	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	C /2

Sule A. Purvis Primary Examiner Art Unit: 1734

Continuation of 10. Other:

- 1. Applicant traverses the §102 rejection of claim 23 on the grounds that Instance discloses a method and apparatus for producing a label. The applicant points to the case Examiner cited, Ex parte Thibault, claiming it is not on point because it is directed to a method and apparatus for making stable monomeric formaldehyde. Applicant then points to Ex parte Leonard stating that 'the materials on which a process is carried out must be accorded weight in determining patentability of a process.' However, in the instant case, the pending rejected claims are apparatus claims, not process claims and thus Ex parte Leonard is not on point. Furthermore, as set forth in the MPEP §2115, "[i]nclusion of material or article worked upon by a structure being claimed does not impart patentability to the claims." In re Young, 75 F.2d 996, 25 USPQ 69 (CCPA 1935).
- 2. In response to applicant's argument that Instance is nonanalogous art, it has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the applicant was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, Instance discloses a process and apparatus for controlling the placement of a label onto a web; Brandon discloses a process and apparatus for placing a component onto a web. The problems associated with placing an object onto a web, whether that object be a label or an absorbent component, are similar and the invention of Instance is reasonably pertinent to that particular problem with which the applicant was concerned. It would be within the purview of an artisan to look to Instance when confronted with the problem of how to control the placement of an object onto a web.
- 3. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).